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SRI LANKA HAS THE LAWS AND THE MONEY, BUT NOT THE STATE TO USE THEM.

November 21, 2026
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  • BY: DAMINTHA GUNASEKERA

    Every budget season we argue about the wrong things. We pore over tax thresholds and VAT concessions; we ask whether the rich paid their share and whether the relief was real, and we miss the one question that actually decides our future. Can the state we are asking to carry all of this actually do it?

    Next year’s budget, tabled last week, is sensible and cautious, and it had to be. Keeping us inside the IMF programme is the price of the next tranche, so the Government stayed the course. Umesh Moramudali, an economist, told The Examiner that the borrowing plan includes no international sovereign bond issuances next year, suggesting the Government is already preparing for another IMF programme in 2027. The president wants 7% growth in the medium term. Almost no economist expects 2027 to clear 5%. That gap between ambition and expectation is the whole story, and nothing in the budget closes it, because closing it was never going to be a matter of numbers. It was going to be a matter of the state.

    Here is a truth we have told ourselves wrong. When people explain China’s rise, they reach for Deng Xiaoping opening the markets and China joining the WTO, as if liberalization alone lit the fuse. That is half the account, and the forgotten half is the one that matters for us. Alongside the market opening, China spent decades rebuilding the machinery of its own state. It reformed its civil service, restructured its state enterprises, and built institutions capable of carrying a plan from a document into a factory. Zhu Rongji’s reforms cut the bureaucracy hard. The market opening worked because there was a competent state underneath it to make it work. Reform the economy without reforming the administration that runs it, and you are rearranging furniture in a house with no foundation.

    That is precisely what we keep doing. The Opposition criticizes this Government for not opening up, for not reforming, for not privatizing fast enough. Fair enough as far as it goes. But what does “reform the economy” even mean if the officials who must implement it do not understand which policies drive growth, and the institutions they work in are not built to pursue it? You can pass every liberalizing law in the manifesto. If the Inland Revenue Department cannot broaden the tax base, if Customs cannot control its own zones, if the Board of Investment cannot act as a genuine one-stop shop, the reform exists only on paper.

     

    This is not my opinion alone. The IMF’s own revenue administration diagnostic, published in October, reads like a catalogue of the problem. Sri Lanka doubled tax revenue from 7.3% of GDP in 2021 to 15.4% in 2025, a real achievement, but the Fund is blunt that the next phase cannot come from raising rates further. It has to come from administration, and administration is where we are weakest. The diagnostic describes staff who lack the skills the work demands, in audit, in analytics, in the money disciplines the job requires. And consider how our service is built. Promotion runs largely on seniority, so the officials who reach the top often arrive in their final year or two and are gone before any reform they begin can take root. The Fund, more drily, calls leadership continuity a critical weakness. It also notes that more than half of income tax filers do not file on time, and that Sri Lanka is the regional outlier on compliance. This is the state we are asking to deliver 7% growth.

    Consider digitalization, the Government’s favourite word. The instinct is right, but the ground truth is humbling. When the passport office first moved applications online, many of the staff did not know the online option existed and could not guide anyone through it. The simplest possible digital service, filling a form on a website, still ended with you standing in a queue in person. Now scale that up to the Unique Digital Identity, to interoperability between departments, to the seamless digital government India and China have built. The Unique ID has slipped from deadline to deadline, from early 2026 to the third quarter to the end of the year, and whatever the procurement and financing reasons offered, the deeper constraint is the one nobody wants to name. A public service that struggles with an online form cannot absorb a national digital identity system, no matter how much money you throw at the software. The Opposition attacks the delay. It should be asking why the capacity to use these tools does not exist.

    And that capacity does not appear by itself. It is built in schools and universities. This is where the budget’s deeper silence lies. A country does not grow by wishing it. It grows by choosing, deliberately, the sectors where it can compete and building the capacity to win them. That is what a real industrial policy is, and this budget does not have one. But an industrial policy is only as good as the people who design and run it, and the budget dedicates nowhere near enough to developing them. We want to compete with the world, and we are not funding the people who would have to do the competing.

    Look at how others built that capacity. Tsinghua University, now one of the institutions driving China’s push to the technological frontier, built that role deliberately, shifting over decades toward graduate and research-intensive education. A country moving up the value chain needs more than a supply of labour. It needs people who can decide which industries to enter and how to win them. That is the distinction we keep missing. Labour matters, and producing even that, our schools have struggled to do. But a country that wants to transform needs a tier above the labour line: researchers who can identify where our edge lies and officials trained to build it. 

    We produce too few graduates as it is, and too many of the ones we do produce enter the workforce, and especially the public service, for the security of a job rather than the ambition of building something. A state that treats its civil service as a safety net rather than an instrument of transformation will keep writing growth targets it has no one equipped to hit.

    Take education. To the Government’s credit, a genuine school curriculum reform is underway, begun in Grade 1 and extending to Grades 2 and 6 next year, and the Prime Minister, who holds the portfolio, has staked real conviction on it. But the reform that decides whether we compete sits a level higher, and there the budget goes quiet. Transforming our universities, building a research tier, producing the pipeline of capable officials a modern economy runs on: none of it is funded in any serious measure. Research and development gets 23.8 billion rupees for 2027; the entire Ministry of Science and Technology, operating costs included, just 7.6 billion. The public administration chapter buys offices, computers, rural roads, salaries, and 110,000 more recruits into the same cadre. And on the very weakness the IMF singled out, a promotion system built on seniority that pushes officials out before they can finish anything, the budget proposes only to act, in its own words, “in alignment with the promotion mechanisms currently in place.” We are reforming the classroom and leaving the machinery of the state untouched. Which brings me to the sharpest irony of this budget. The president spoke of reforming the Board of Investment and creating a new agency to promote investment. Good. That is exactly the kind of administrative reform we need. But we already passed it. The Economic Transformation Act, enacted in 2024, did precisely this and far more besides. It replaced the BOI with an Economic Commission to lead investment promotion, and it created Zones SL to run dedicated investment zones, with land and infrastructure set aside for foreign investment and streamlined out of the usual customs and tax tangle. It was the administrative architecture we are now told we lack. This Government shelved it after taking office, and is now, three budgets later, proposing to build something that looks remarkably like what it stopped.

    This is why Sri Lanka goes nowhere. Not because we lack ideas, and not even, mostly, because we lack money. It is because our politics rewards being seen to be right over actually being right. A good law passed by the other side is left to gather dust, then reinvented under a new name so the credit lands correctly. The stability the Government maintained, to its genuine credit, was always the easy part. Poverty alleviation, investment, exports, the tax relief people are waiting for, all of it rests on a public sector that can deliver, and we are not building one. A budget cannot transform a country. A capable state can. Until we are willing to spend our political capital on the unglamorous work of fixing the machinery of government, on the cadre, the institutions, the schools that feed them, we will keep tabling sensible budgets and wondering why the transformation never comes. The numbers were never the point. The people meant to deliver them always were.

     
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